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In the present paper the cost reductions associated with infrastructure and private capital
provision are examined through the application of the duality theory. This theoretical
framework allows us to determine a wide range of public capital effects both in the short and
long term. This way, it is observed how public capital directly affects costs in the short run
while presenting an indirect channel in the long run through its effect on private capital. The
model is applied to the Spanish regions for twelve manufacturing sectors during the eighties.
The best specification is chosen based on the results of several statistics, rejecting the existence
of a long run equilibrium for inputs demand, so that private capital is obtained to be a quasi-fix
input in the short run. Both public and private capital seem to have reduced manufacturing costs
though with a high sectoral and regional variability.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Theories derived from the classical school consider transport and other infrastructure
as important elements in any area’s production function, increasing the efficiency of
the production system and estimulating private activity. Notwithstanding the assumed
importance of public infrastructure, the magnitudes of its gains are far from being
clearly determined. Initially, most studies focused on public capital impact on output
and productivity through the use of neoclassical production functions.
1 Results in
these initial studies generally support a positive effect of public capital, but the range
of results is too large to be conclusive and many deficiencies were found thereafter.
For example, in the work of Aschauer (1989) an unforseen result was that public
capital has a substantially higher impact on output than private capital itself, which is
a nonsensical result. Private capital is supposed to be directly devoted to the
production process while public investment in infrastructure also plays other roles like
reducing disparities and other social objectives that would hardly be reflected in
domestic product measures. Therefore, several works have called into question the
plausibility of the results of these initial studies due to econometric and specification
problems. When these problems were accounted for, some negative results appeared,
making us think that the optimistic conclusions of the initial works could had a weak
foundation (Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Garcia-Mila et al., 1996).
Nevertheless, it is unthinkable that the gross national product would remain the same
if roads, harbors, bridges and airports were taken out of the system. For this reason,
the difficulty of assigning a quantitative role to public capital has been argued by some
authors (Mullen et al., 1996, De la Fuente, 1996) as being a consequence of both the
emphasis that most studies put on the direct effect of infrastructures and the rigidity of
the production function. On the one hand, instead of thinking that public capital has
no impact on productivity or output, we should pay more attention to the indirect
infrastructure’s role supposing changes on traditional inputs. On the other hand, the
production function has been considered inaccurate due to the restrictions imposed on
the technology and the firms’ behavior and for not taking into account private input
prices which would affect the intensity in which they are used. In order to overcome
this twofold problematic issues the use of the duality theory has been suggested. The
use of the duality theory through the estimation of cost and profit functions allows us
to examine the complementary or substitutability relationship among private and2
public factors as well as the marginal effect of infrastructure on the firms cost
structure.
The present paper pursues the same line of research, the main purpose of which is to
enable a better understanding of the linkage between the publicly provided input and
the nature of the manufacturing production process. The considered methodology is a
cost function that allows us to disentangle the total effect of public capital into the
different effects on the various private factors. Among the studies that have used cost
functions aggregated with public capital we can point out those from Berndt and
Hansson (1991) for the Swedish case, Morrison and Schwartz (1992, 1996) and Nadiri
and Mamuneas (1994) for the US, Conrad and Seitz (1992), Seitz (1995) and Seitz
and Licht (1995) for the German economy and Sturm (1997) for the Netherlands, and
Aviles et al. (1997a, 1997b) for Spain. However, this paper extends these approaches
to the consideration of several topics which are commonly avoided.
On the one hand, when analyzing public capital effect through the use of duality
theory one may use either a long-run cost function or a variable cost function. In the
former case, one is assuming that all factors of production can be costlessly adjusted
so that the firm instantaneously determines long run factor demands. In the latter, it is
considered that adjustment costs beyond the control of the firm do not allow inputs to
adjust instantaneously to their long run equilibrium levels. Rather that assuming these
ideas a priori, in the present paper we use the test developed by Schankerman and
Nadiri (1986) to acknowledge into the possible divergence of private capital from its
static equilibrium values. This way, the most appropriate cost model according to the
Spanish manufacturing characteristics will be taken into consideration.
Second, if private capital turns out to be a quasi-fixed input, we will distinguish
between two different effects of public infrastructures on costs: first, by a direct
channel affecting variable costs and second, by an indirect one that comes from
changes in the private capital intensities. Former papers using cost functions only
consider the short run effect of public capital with the exception of Morrison and
Schwartz (1996) which considers a long run effect through output adjustments.
However, in the present paper we are able to measure the long run effects of public
infrastructure since the quasi-fixed input is allowed to adjust in response to public3
capital changes in the long run. This long run cost effect through altering capital
intensities has been considered in Nadiri and Kim (1996) and Bernstein and Yan
(1997) to estimate the effects of R&D spillovers on the cost and production structure.
However, as far as we know, it has not yet been used when computing public
infrastructure effects on production costs.
We think that this latter point is specially important for the study of the impact of
infrastructure investments. Improvements in the endowments of public capital may
have two effects. It increases profitability of the production process in the existing
firms and, as a consequence, it makes more attractive the location of new activities in
the area. Then, we define a short run effect that is experienced by firms that are
already producing. This is due to cost reduction in variable inputs as a consequence of
the new public capital stock. Further, we define a long run effect by which higher
profitability encourages new investments in private capital that increase the plant of
the existing firms or cause more firms operating in the economy. This is in line with
the theoretical ideas in Martin and Rogers (1995) and Ciccone and Hall (1996), that
may also provoke sectoral restructuting in the economy.
Finally, empirical models to study the impact of infrastructures on growth suffer from
strong multicollinearity. As stated in Chunrong and Cassou (1997) this may cause
misleading conclusions on the significance and size of the effect. The problem is
exhacerbated when applying the duality theory because of the use of very general
functions (such as the translog) which include a large number of parameters. In order
avoid this problem, we increase the cross-section variability by descending to a
regional and sectoral level at the same time. This way, we also yield additional
insights about the variability of public capital effects across economic sectors and
regions. In fact, Seitz and Licht (1995) claim that their results obtained from the
estimation of a cost function in the regional German case could be affected by the
great differences existing in the sectoral structure of manufacturing industry across the
federal states in Germany. Going on with these ideas, the present paper takes into
consideration both a sectoral and regional disaggregation in the Spanish case during
the eighties.4
The paper is outlined as follows. In the second section the conceptual model based on
duality theory is presented as well as the public capital elasticities. Section third
describes the empirical specification and the econometric issues. The database and the
empirical results are subsequently presented and discussed in section 4. Finally, some
concluding remarks and suggestions for further research are given in section 5.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FIRM BEHAVIOR MODEL WITH
PUBLIC CAPITAL
Short and Long Run Cost Functions
A cost function is a mathematical representation of the cost-minimizing problem faced
by firms (Chambers, 1988). In this framework, it will be possible to explicitly include
public capital in order to take into account the cost effect of this kind of external
factor.
Let’s consider a production function, where Y is the output and Xi (i=1,...,r) the i-th
input:
Yf X X X r = ( , ,..., ) 12 (1)
It is assumed that the firm is constrained to accept a vector of input prices, P1,...,Pr, so
that the optimization problem that firms face consists in deciding the amount of inputs
that minimizes the cost for producing a given output,Y . Then, we can obtain a group
of demand functions for private inputs:
Xf P P Y ii r = ( ,..., , ) 1 (2)
Being  Xi
*  the optimum amount of input, the level of optimum cost, that is, the
solution to the optimization problem yields a cost function that is dual to the
production function, being dependent on input prices and output:
2
CP Y PX f P P Y ii i i r
* *
, ( , ) ( ,..., ) =× = å 1 (3)
where * denotes values at the equilibrium.
In such a framework, we are assuming that all factors of production can be costlessly
adjusted so that the firm instantaneously determines long run factor demands.
Nevertheless, rather than assuming that all inputs adjust instantaneously to their long
run equilibrium values, there are reasons to believe in the absence of such an
adjustment mechanism for some factors. We can think of costs of investment and
disinvestment, price controls and regulations, credit rationing and institutional5
constraints that are beyond the control of an individual firm in the short-run. Based on
these ideas, we adopt a framework that distinguishes variable from quasi-fixed inputs,
where the latter adjust only partially to their full equilibrium levels within one time
period. Therefore, we consider short run cost functions apart from long run cost
functions. In the former ones, the presence of some inputs fixed at values other than
their full equilibrium level implies that there are adjustment cost associated with
changing the quasi-fixed factors. In this case, the goal of the firm is to minimize the
cost of variable factors conditional on a given stock of quasi-fixed factors. In the
latter, all inputs are in any period at their full equilibrium values.
Specifically, the variable cost function we are using in this paper is specified as
follows:
VC VC P P Y Kp Kg LM = (, ; , ) ,
__ (4)
where we consider two variable private inputs, labor (L) and intermediates (M) which
appear in the cost function through their prices, PL,  and PM respectively; and a quasi-




 is output and Kg is public capital (external input).
3
The total short-run cost function is the sum of the variable cost and the cost of the
existing private capital:
SC VC P Kp Kp =+
_ (5)
Public infrastructure is therefore considered as an unpaid fixed input in the production
process, on which firms have little or null control.
4 Therefore, this cost function
permits the combination of internal scale economies in the production process due to
private inputs (both variable and quasi-fixed) and the external scale economies, if
existing, provided by the public input. That is, scale economies in cost function are
now outlined including this new argument, so that publicly provided infrastructure
could affect the shape of the average cost curve. As far as this specification goes, after
increasing or improving public capital endowment, firms will adjust the decisions on
the amounts of the different private inputs used in the production process according to
the substitutive or complementary relationship each one of them maintain with
infrastructures, and given the existing amount of quasi-fixed inputs. This will be the
short run effect of infrastructure investments in the production process. Firms will
decide the optimal amount of physical capital for the new endowment of public capital6
as well. Then, in the long run investments in infrastructure may have an additional
effect through decisions of allocation of private capital and the consequent cost
reduction effects of private capital.
Assuming that variable input prices are exogenous to the producer, and applying
Shephard’s Lemma (Chambers, 1988), it is possible to obtain the unique vector of the
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Furthermore, we can calculate each factor share (Zi), that is, the percentage of the cost





















Equation set (5) and (7) constitutes the solution to what can be defined as the short run
equilibrium related to variable factors, constrained to fixed values for Y, Kp and Kg.
5
That is, the preceding functions, and consequently the short run solution, are not
independent of the quasi-fixed factors. From these functions we can obtain the
required short run elasticities, as in the case in which private capital is supposed to be
at equilibrium.
On the other hand, the long-run demand for quasi-fixed factors, Kp
* in our case, is

















That means that demand for Kp depends on prices of variable inputs, the fixed
quantities of output and public capital, and its own price. Let
Kp g P P P Y Kg LMK p
*
_
(,, , , ) = (9)
be the solution to (8). Substituting (9) into (5), we get the long run cost function:
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Thus, equations (5), (6) --or (7)-- and (9) characterize the long-run equilibrium. From
them, long run elasticities will be obtained. From (10) it is worth noting that Kg may
affect long run cost in different ways: by a direct channel affecting variable cost, and
by an indirect channel throught its effect on Kp. The latter will include an extra effect7
on variable cost, by complementarity/substitutability between private capital and
variable inputs, and the direct effect of Kp on the long run cost.
Short and Long Run Cost Elasticities
From the functions previously described it is possible to asses the impact of public
capital investments on short and long run costs of production. This effect will be
measured by elasticities of cost, input demand and output with respect to the stock of
infrastructures. In this sense, the change in short run cost due to a marginal addition to
the infrastructure stock is the short run cost elasticity to Kg:
eSC Kg

























where superscript SR denotes short run. Though not specified during all the analysis,
the output is always supposed to be fixed, so that all the elasticities are computed
considering a fixed amount of Y (Y
_
).
Hence, it is possible to obtain measures of the short run implicit willingness of private
manufactures to pay for public capital, which is known as (short run) infrastructure
shadow price. It is defined as the value of savings experienced by firms as a result of
increasing infrastructure endowment. As long as this value is positive, firms benefit
from having additional infrastructures, since they permit obtaining short run cost savings
and hence productivity improvements.
6 Short run infrastructure shadow price may be
specified as follows:






















In fact, the measure will be positive as long as public capital supposes benefits in terms
of substitution relationships with variable inputs, in other words, as long as public
infrastructure represents efficiency changes in terms of decreases in variable inputs use
and thus variable costs. Hence, following Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994), it can be said
that firms will adjust their production decisions with respect to their own factors
according to the relationship between them and public sector capital. This is what these
authors call the factor bias effect of public capital, which can be computed as the short





















The relationship between public capital and variable inputs can be of substitutability or





XiKg>0) or neutral (e
SR
XiKg=0). Thus, as stated before, a positive shadow price would
imply a net substitutive relationship between public capital and variable inputs. In other
words, if there is an increase in the publicly provided input and it is substitutive
(complementary) to variable inputs, the infrastructure increase will reduce (increase)
industrial variable costs and, therefore, the shadow price will be positive (negative).
Specifically, based on the variable cost function and differentiating it with respect to
public capital, we decompose the cost saving effect provided by public capital into the
effects on the demand for the considered variable factors:


























where it is shown how infrastructures shadow price is dependent on the value of the
relationships between public capital and variable inputs.
Moreover, it is commonly thought that increases in public capital stocks will intensify
private economic performance. The impact of infrastructure on the short run level of
production can be computed as the infrastructure elasticity with respect to output thanks


































From which we can obtain the magnitudes of the returns to scale as:


















Finally, although not directly related to public capital, in case of private capital not
being in its long-run equilibrium level, the same exact effects that have been presented
for public capital can be obtained for the private input, since it should be considered









Regarding long run effects of public capital, they are obtained in much the same way
as the described above for the short run. However, variations in cost and variable9
inputs demand caused by changes in the stock of private capital as response to
variations in infrastructure endowment must be added to the short run effect. It should
be noted that this latter effect may foster the short run effect or, on the contrary, may
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where superscript LR denotes long run. The eKp* Kg is obtained from equation (9), while
the eKp* Xi is computed using a system of derivatives of implicit functions from equations
(7) and (9).
7 Finally, eXi Kg is the short run factor bias effect. In this model, eKpKg
LR
adquires special relevance as it summarises the attraction effect of the public capital
investments. That is, to what extend improvements in public capital endowments in an
economy enhance private activity. Obviously, this is one of the main objectives when
public investments aims at spurring economic development.
Long run shadow price of infrastructures and factors bias will be evaluated in Kp
*  as
well, that is, they will include changes in variable inputs due to movements in private
capital stock as a result of the new infrastructure endowment:
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 where:
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with  eXi Kg and eXiKp as in the short run and  eKpKg
LR  as expressed above. It can be
observed how the long run substitution/complementary relationships may be
decomposed into both a direct effect (eXK g
SR
i ) and an indirect one, which is the
interaction between relationship of private-public capitals and the
substitution/complementary relationship between variable inputs and the quasi-fixed
factor.
The same will apply to the output elasticity to Kg in the long run, that now will
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obtaining eKp* Y from equation (9), and  eXi Y from equation (7) for both variable inputs.
Most of these elasticities in the long run can be obtained for private capital as well
though the explanation is different in this case. So, private capital will have not only a
direct effect on costs in the short run but also an indirect one through adjustments in
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(22)
where eSCXi is obtained through the system of derivatives of implicit functions from
equations (7) and (9) as stated aboved, and eXiKp from equation (7) for both inputs. The
rest of long run effects for private capital are obtained in much the same way as for the
public capital case though the bias effect of private capital in the long run, that is, the
effect of private capital on the variable inputs is exactly the same one as in the short run.
3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES
Empirical Specification
The empirical work to test the effect of public capital endowment on the performance
of the manufactures is based on a translog cost function, a general second degree
polynomial in logs, with the following form:
ln ln ln ln ln ln
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(23)
where t is a time trend which summarises technological change , as in, for instance,
Morrison and Schwartz (1996).11
This functional form permits the consideration of a great range of substitution
possibilities while accommodating to any production technology without being
necessary to impose a priori restrictions on returns to scale.
8 We have introduced
intermediates price as a relative factor to ensure that the function is homogeneous of
degree one in factor prices. Besides, any kind of a priori returns to scale are imposed.
For ease of notation, the variables in equation (23) and subsequents do not carry
indices either for the period of time, industries or regions.
Applying Shephard’s Lemma to equation (23) we obtain the share equations for
variable inputs. For the two variable factors we consider, only one equation is
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Therefore, the short-run equilibrium is denoted by equations (23) and (24). On the
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The long-run equilibrium is represented by equations (23), (24) and (25). From the
estimation of these equations we will obtain the main effects of public and private
capital both in the short and long term.
Econometric Issues
For empirical implementation purposes the models have to be imbedded within a
stochastic framework. To do this we consider that errors in cost and variable factors
demands are due to errors in optimization and that the relation in the long run
represents unanticipated information which becomes available after the time the
investment decision is made. The models specified in equations (23)-(24) and (25) are
then estimated using iterative Zellner techniques for Seemingly Unrelated Regression
(SUR) equations since it is likely that the error terms across equations will be
correlated.12
An additional econometric issue is the pooling of the time series for the Spanish
regions with all their manufacturing sectors. We want to account for unobservable
sectoral and regional differences without imposing the way in which these differences
should be introduced in the model, either as a fixed effects model through the
introduction of dummies or as an error components model considering these effects as
part of the error term. In order to choose the appropriate method of estimation, we use
the Hausman test with the null hypothesis of uncorrelation between individual effects
and explanatory variables which indicates the adequacy of considering an error
components model (Baltagi (1995), pp.68).
Two theoretical aspects commented in section 2 are going to be tested in our model:
an investigation into departure of quasi-fixed inputs from their static equilibrium
levels and the validity of the Shephard’s Lemma.
First, being aware of the short-run fixity of some inputs such as private capital in the
present case, the distinction between short- and long-run functional forms must be
well accounted for. With this purpose, we use the test developed by Schankerman and
Nadiri (1986) to acknowledge into the possible divergence of quasi-fixed factors from
their static equilibrium levels. Let’s consider b0 the parameter estimates vector in the
cost function equation alone (eq. 23), b1  the parameter vector in the demand (or share)
functions for variable inputs (eq. 24) and b2 the parameter vector obtained from the
estimation of the quasi-fixed inputs (eq. 25). The test is constructed under the null
hypothesis that the fixed factors are at their static equilibrium levels, so that b2 Ì b0.
In fact, if considering the partition of the vector b0  = (b0
1, b0
2) where the elements of b
0
1  appears in (23) but not in (25) under the null, then one can specify the null
hypothesis as b2 = b0
2. This way, the estimator of the long run equilibrium model
(let’s say  $ b ) imposes the restriction implied by the test, whereas the estimator of the
short-run equilibrium model (say 
~
b ) does not impose any restriction. The constraint
estimator  $ b  is consistent under the null but not under an alternative hypothesis, while
the unconstrained estimator 
~
b  is consistent under both the null and the alternative.
Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) construct a Hausman test, based on a comparison of
the values in  $ b  and 
~
b  testing the null that firms are in the long run equilibrium:13
NV q (
~ $)’ $ (
~ $) bb bb c -- ~
-12 (26)
where N is the number of observations,  $ V is the consistent estimator of V, with V = V1
- V2, being V1 the asymptotic covariance matrix for 
~
b  and V2 the asymptotic
covariance matrix for  $ b . The test is distributed as a chi-square with degrees of
freedom being equal to the number of restrictions, q.
Second, neoclassical production theory implies that the derived cost share equations
are related to the cost function, so that parameters in (24) are, therefore, the same as
those in (23). In most of the empirical works using duality theory, these restrictions
associated to the Shephard’s Lemma are imposed a priori without being previously
tested. If these restrictions were not true one would be in fact rejecting some
assumptions of the neoclassical theory of production such as the cost-minimizing
behavior among others. As a result, from a statistical point of view one would be
imposing values on the estimates which are against the data, so that, if the parameters
of the derived cost share equation could not be considered the same as those of the
cost function, the calculation of the effects obtained from them would not be
accurated. To avoid this problem, we test for the validity of the Shephard’s Lemma in
the cost function which means testing for the consistency within the model. In order to
implement the test we consider that b0 is the parameter estimates vector in the cost
function equation that appear in the demand functions for variable inputs, while b1 is
the parameter vector in the share functions for variable inputs. This way, the null
hypothesis would indicate that the neoclassical theory is accepted since the share and
cost equations yield the same parameters, b0 = b1. The parameter set has to be
consistent with the theory which depends on the specific functional form considered.
Since we use a translog form, the parameter set will be such that symmetry and linear
homogeneity in variable inputs are satisfied. In our case we impose these conditions in
the especification itself so that it is not necessary to further concern about. The
alternative hypothesis is b0 ¹  b1. The test we use is the traditional test for linear
restrictions of the coefficients of SUR models given in Judge et al. (1988, pp. 457-
459), which is distributed as a c
2 with as many degrees of freedom as the number of
restrictions, that is, the number of parameters in b1.
4. EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH CASE14
Data
The data used for the empirical implementation are annual data on output, prices and
quantities of private inputs in 12 manufacturing sectors of the 15 regions of Spain
(NUTS II level, without the island regions) from 1980 to 1991. Data have been
obtained from two main sources. First, output, intermediates, labor costs and number
of workers employed are obtained from the Encuesta Industrial (Industrial Survey)
produced by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE, Spanish Statistical Office).
Second, series of private and public capital stocks are taken from “El Stock de Capital
en la Economía Española” (The Capital Stock in the Spanish Economy, FBBV, 1995),
where private capital data are given with a maximum desegregation of 13 sectors.
Therefore, though data on Encuesta Industrial are given for 89 manufacturing sectors,
our empirical implementation fails to consider more than 13 sectors.
9 However, due to
the high sectoral and territorial desegregation of the data in the Encuesta Industrial and
for confidentiality reasons the INE provides missing values when it is necessary to
comply to the statistical secret guaranteed by the survey. The incidence of missing
data in the 13 manufacturing sectors at a regional level is only important in the sector
gathering office equipment, precision and optics, so that we finally decided not to
consider it.
10 Thus, the twelve manufacturing sectors finally considered in the present
study are shown in table 1:
Data provided by the Encuesta Industrial are given in nominal values, being necessary
the use of sector-specific producer price indices to deflate them. The Programa de
Investigaciones Económicas (Economic Research Program) supplied us with this
deflactor (Jaumandreu and Jiménez, 1992). Since the deflation is initially made for 89
sectors and then we aggregate to 12 sectors, we ensure that the real input series are
deflated after considering the importance of each sector in each group. All variables
are then used at constant 1990 prices.
         Table 1. Description of the industrial groupings
1 Metallic minerals and first transformation of metals (9-11)
2 Non metallic minerals and products (12-18)
3 Chemistry (19-30)
4 Metallic products and metalwork (31-35)
5 Agricultural and industrial machinery and equipment (36-37)
6 Electric machinery and material (39-40)
7 Transports material (41-45)15
8 Food products, alcohol, drinks and tobacco (47-64)
9 Textiles, leather and shoes (54-74)
10 Paper and derivatives and printing (80-82)
11 Rubber and plastic derivatives (83-84)
12 Wood, cork and derivatives and other manufactures (75-79, 85-89)
   NOTE: In brackets the correspondence to group data from Encuesta Industrial (FBBV, 1995)
Price for employment (PL) is obtained by dividing labor costs by the number of
employments. The index price of intermediate inputs (PM) is measured by dividing the
nominal intermediate input series by the constructed real intermediate input series.
The rental rate of private capital (PKp) is computed as PKp = q(r+d), where q is the
private capital investment deflator obtained from FBBV (1995), r is the discount rate for
more than two years government bonds, and d is the private capital depreciation rate, the






1 , with It as private capital
investment.
11 All data except interest rate, depreciation rates and private capital
investment deflator have been computed region-specific. Private capital is measured by
the total net capital stocks of manufacturing industry in each region. Public capital stock
includes the net monetary stock of core infrastructures, that is, roads and highways,
railway, harbors and maritime signaling, airports, water and sewage facilities and urban
structures.
12 Since public infrastructures are not supposed to have an immediate effect
on industrial activity, the public capital stock variable enters the model with one period
lag.
Main Results
In order to select the appropriate model we implement the two tests signalled above.
The value of the test proposed by Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) is highly
significant(value of 338914.5), indicating strong rejection of static equilibrium for
private capital and thus, rejection of the assumption of long-run equilibrium. The
appropriate model to estimate is therefore the set of equations (23) and (24) while
equation (25) is estimated without imposing the long run restrictions. Nevertheless,
when testing the validity of the Shephard’s Lemma in the cost function it is obtained
that the restriction is rejected with a value of 76.37. As far as we know, most of the
empirical works do not test the validity of this lemma whereas the ones testing this
hypothesis have strongly rejected it (Appelbaum, 1978 for the USA; Domenech
(1993) for the Spanish banking sector), so that it seems to be that the duality theory16
does not work very well in practice. Therefore,since the Shephard’s Lemma is rejected
for the Spanish manufacturing sector, it would be more adequate to estimate the cost
function alone. However, following Morrison and Schwartz (1996) it should be
thought that the utilization of the restricted SURE model imposes structure and
robustness to the model, while increasing efficiency. This way, imposing the
restrictions among the parameters of the two first equations and estimating by Zellner
techniques we should obtain more reasonable parameters from an economic
viewpoint.
The results for the estimation of the cost function and the function for private capital
are shown in tables 2 and 3, respectively. In both, the null of joint non significance of
the parameters of public capital is strongly rejected. Moreover, since we are interested
in assessing on the variability of infrastructure effects across manufacturing sectors
and regions, we have implemented several F-homogeneity tests in order to get a sense
of the necessity of considering specific sectoral and regional effects. Then, we
compare the previous model with three alternative models: without any kinds of effect
(test 2), without regional effects (test 3) and without sectoral effects (test 4). The null
hypothesis that the coefficients of the dummies are zero is rejected in all three cases,
suggesting that both intersectoral and interregional differences are present in the cost
level and in the equilibrium capital share for the Spanish case. Therefore, according to
these results we could think that the same input endowments and factor prices may
cause different regional/sectoral cost levels due to the technology and efficiency
characterising industries in each region. In fact, this seems to be the case of the
regions of Spain, since several studies analyzing scale economies, market power or
technological levels for Spain have obtained great differences across industries and
regions (Suárez, 1992; Velázquez, 1993; De La Fuente, 1996; Moreno et al., 1998).
Given these findings, it could be thought of the adequacy of the individual estimation
of the cost function for each sector (considering regional and time variability) and for
each region (considering sectoral and time variability). Nevertheless, in doing so we
face the problem of the high degree of multicollinearity that functions considering
cross-products of the variables encounter. For this reason, we rather prefer estimating
the functions with the whole panel data set in order to increase variability while
controlling for regional and sectoral differences through the consideration of different
levels in the intercept term. This way, the estimates obtained will be reliable, and still17
we can obtain specific elasticities for public capital and scale economies for each
region and sector, offering interesting conclusions for the orientation of policy making
referred to public capital investments.
Based on the resulting estimated parameters, the effects mentioned in section 2 about
public and private capital effects on economic performance are measured by
calculating the required derivatives. Even though all the indicators below have been
measured for each region and sector in every year, we only present some general
averages. Concretely we present four averages: regional, sectoral, temporal and global
averages. They have been obtained by weighting the elasticity of each observation by
the rate that the output in this specific observation represents over the global output in
the region, sector or time period, respectively.
The cost elasticity with respect to public capital in the short run, eCkg, (table 4) has a
negative average (-0.059) indicating that when public capital stock increases 1%, the
percentage decrease in private production cost is 0.059%. This indicates that in
general terms Spanish manufactures did benefit from a reduction in costs with public
capital increases during the eighties, with small changes among regions and a higher
variation across sectors. In this sense it should be pointed out the large value for the
Food and Beverage industry(S8)
13. Furthermore, this elasticity has slightly increased
with time, showing how the reductions in costs due to public infrastructure have
continued during the considered period. Besides, Andalucia is the region presenting
the lowest cost reduction from infrastructure while La Rioja seems to be the one
benefiting the most, though the difference among them is not high. In general terms, it
can be concluded that the cost elasticity with respect to infrastructure obtained in the
Spanish case is in line with the ones reported in studies for American and German
economies as shown in table 8:
Table 8. Some results on cost elasticity with respect to public capital (without distinction short-long term)
Morrison and Schwartz (1992)
Regional
Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994)
Sectoral




Aver. -0.049 -0.129 -0.216 -0.127
Max. 0.049 0.0234 -0.018 N/A
Min. -0.169 -0.2113 -0.357 N/A18
This way, the measures of the implicit willingness of private sector to pay for
infrastructures according to the values of savings experienced by an industry in the
short run follow the same pattern as the one described for the former elasticity, with a
positive price average. A positive sign for infrastructures shadow price in the short
term implies a net substitutive relationship between public capital and variable inputs.
This can be observed analyzing the type of relationship between public capital and
each variable factor, in other words, obtaining the infrastructure elasticity of the
conditional demand for labor and intermediates. On average, from the results it can be
concluded that infrastructure capital is labor saving and intermediates using for all
regions and sectors during the whole period. Indeed, in the literature there has been a
general conclusion in favor of a substitutability relationship between labor and public
capital (Berdnt and Hanson, 1991; Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; Seitz and Licht,
1995) indicating that public infrastructure investment allows firms to produce the
same output with lower labor costs. However, two aspects are worthy pointing out:
first, the elasticities for labor are bigger than for intermediates indicating that public
capital effect reducing labor can be of a certain importance (with a global average of -
0.035) while the effect on intermediates is relatively low (0.009); second, the
variability across sectors, regions and time periods for intermediates elasticity is really
low.
All these results concerning infrastructure have equally been obtained for private
capital (table 5). In general terms, it can be said that although there is also a
significative difference across regions and sectors, the average of the estimated
elasticity of production cost with respect to private capital stock is -0.064, being
always negative. Thus, there is a cost reducing effect associated with the supply of
private capital, being higher for the cases of Rioja and Galicia and lower for
Cantabria. As a consequence, private capital shadow price is always positive,
decreasing from early to mid eighties and increasing again after 1987, when the
Spanish economy experienced a period of economic boom. This positive shadow price
can be explained by a net substitutive relationship that is disentangled in a substitution
relation with intermediates and a positive relationship between private capital and
labor. Once again, there are differences across regions and sectors which are small,
specially in the case of intermediates.19
Nevertheless, as signalled in section 2, public capital may influence private costs and
input demands in the long term through changes in private capital, which is
considered to be fixed in the short term. According to the results in table 4, the
elasticity of costs with respect to public capital in the long run slightly decreased if
compared to the short run value, though it increased in some regions (significantly in
Cataluña) while being almost equal in some other regions (Cantabria, Madrid and
Murcia). If we disentangle this general long-run effect, we observe that increases in
public infrastructure have led to global increases in private capital stock (what we
have called locational effect of public capital) with an average elasticity of 0.076 in
the short run and 0.060 in the long run (table 6). And increases in private capital have
supposed general percentage decreases in costs given the negative average elasticity of
cost to private capital of 0.064. Therefore, in general terms, we would expect a long-
run cost elasticity with respect to public capital that would be higher that the short-run
one. However, since we are obtaining a weighted average and there are regions and
sectors with a negative attraction of private capital when increasing public
infrastructure, here comes the lower value in the long run. This way, there are
significant variations across regions and sectors that are worthy considering. There are
only some regions and sectors where public capital has been able to attract private
investment in the long run like La Rioja, País Vasco, Cataluña and Cantabria,
specially in sectors of Chemistry (S3), Metalwork (S4) and Electric material (6). In the
rest of the regions, public capital has diminished private capital stock. Therefore,
public capital has not been able to attract private investment in all the Spanish regions
and industries during the eighties. This result supports our belief on the necessity of
considering a separate effect for different regions and industries. According to this
result above, the long-run shadow price for public capital is pretty similar to the short-
run one.
Also in the long run, the elasticities of private inputs demands with respect to public
capital have decreased in general terms if compared to the short-run ones, while
maintaining the same sign (table 4). Nevertheless, the variability is very big among
regions and sectors so that it is difficult to get general conclusions in those cases.
Once again, the same pattern than in the short term is obtained, that is, a lower value
for public capital influence on intermediates than on labor and a low variability across
sectors and regions for intermediates. This result makes us think about the fact that20
intermediates is a factor that depends more on the business cycle than in its
relationship with the rest of inputs.
In the long term, the global average cost elasticity with respect to private capital (table
5) has increased, turning into a positive value. However, this weighted average hides
interesting conclusions for some regions, sectors and time periods. In this sense, even
though most regions obtain positive values for this elasticity in the long run, some
others like Valencia, Madrid, Castilla-Mancha, Asturias and Aragón and sectors 2
(Non-metallic minerals) and 11 (Rubber and plastic) present negative values which
are higher in the long run. Furthermore, we should keep in mind that we are dealing
with aggregate economies. Then, if public capital enhances and attracts private
activity, the aggregate cost measures for an industry in a given region will be higher
the larger the stock of public capital, even when it would cause decreases at the firm
level.
Finally, in table 7 we show the elasticities concerning output. Specifically, the
elasticity of output with respect to public capital has an average of 0.079, with small
differences across regions and increasing along with time. This value is very similar to
the one obtained for public capital elasticity when using the production function
framework for the Spanish economy (Mas et al, 1998; Moreno et al., 1998), validating
the results herein obtained. Besides, the elasticity of output with respect to public
capital has grown in the long run and becomes more variable than in the short run.
The explanation for this result is found in the fact that the returns to scale in the long
run are higher that in the short run.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In the present paper we have theoretically derived the long run effects of public
infrastructure on cost and production performance from a dual approach. Previous
works aiming at analysing those effects have just considered short run responses
through adjustments in variable inputs and considering private capital at its
equilibrium level. On the contrary, herein we have allowed for infrastructure
endowment to interact with private capital, that has been supposed to be a quasi-fixed
input. The motivation has been the belief that infrastructures may alter the
performance of an economy not only through effects on variable inputs (short run) but21
also through a locational effect, by which it may increase the total amount of private
capital in the economy. Furthermore, the effects of private capital have also been
derived for the short and long run. It allows to compare the contribution to cost saving
of both types of capital.
Applied to the Spanish regional manufactures, the present paper has estimated a cost
function in a translog form, based on the results of several statistics, rejecting the
accuracy of the Shephard´s Lemma as well as the existence of a long run equilibrium
for private capital. The dual approach leads us to conclude that, in average, increasing
the stock of infrastructure has had a positive impact in terms of increasing the
efficiency (decreasing costs) of production. Even though this result is obtained both in
the short and long run, in the latter case its magnitude is smaller. This is due to the
fact that, in average, increases in private capital, as a consequence of improvements in
infrastructure endowments, has increased aggregate activity and then total costs in the
representative economy.
Further, regional and sectoral variability of all the effects is far from being negligible,
basically in the latter. As a consequence, conclusions on the effects of infrastructure
investments based on aggregate results may be misleading. These differences in
sectoral responses would support the sectoral restructuring advocated by some
theoretical models on the impact of publicly provided inputs of production.
                                                          
1 See Munnell (1992) and Gramlich (1994) for a review of the main studies of infrastructure impact on
development.
2 See Chambers (1988) for detailed description of cost function properties.
3 A shortcoming in the model is that public capital does not alter relative input prices since they are exogenous.
4 It could be argued that firms do influence the amount of public capital they can use through voting with the feet,
for example. For the present, in this paper we will assume that this influence is not important.
5 The use of demand functions or factor share functions is equally correct. So, alternatively, we could talk about
the set (5) and (6).
6 In this framework we are considering that public capital is not paid by firms, since it is supposed to be an
exogenous input. Nevertheless, even though firms don’t face the direct costs of accumulating this input, firms do
pay for infrastructures in terms of taxes, so that there would exist a social costs for getting an adequate public
capital provision. From this perspective, the shadow price obtained through this theoretical model will exaggerate
the social impact of public infrastructures.
7 In which cost and Kp responses to variations in variable inputs (L and M) are determined
simultaneously.
8 Guilkey et al. (1983) demonstrates the translog form superiority over alternate functional forms in Monte Carlo
studies. However,  some other studies about public capital effects have considered other functional forms, such as
a Generalized Leontief or a Generalized Cobb-Douglas restricted cost function. In this sense, it would be worthy
studying the sensitivity of the results to the different specifications.
9 Both capital stocks are calculated by using the perpetual inventory method. For more information, see FBBV
(1995).
10 The percentage of missing values for regions with respect to the total value at a national level is less than 2 %
for all considered variables in almost all sectors, ranging between 3 % and 5 % for sectors of Chemistry and Food22
                                                                                                                                                                     
and drinks, and being more that 5 % for sector of Office equipment, precision and optics. In order to avoid a
negative incidence of missing data in the results referred to this latter sector, it has not been considered in the
study. In a similar way, we only consider 15 out of the 17 regions in Spain given the missing values for Balearic
and Canary Islands in several sectors. However, discarding these two regions will have a minimal repercussion in
our analysis since the industrial activity in them is really scarce and their economic performance depends on the
international business cycle even more that in the Spanish one. Besides, the spillover effects among the islands and
the other regions are thought to be minimal.
11 Following the idea given by Berndt and Hansson (1991), corporate taxes are not included in the private capital price
measure. For further information on factor prices for capital inputs, see the concept of the user cost of capital
developed by Jorgenson (1963).
12 Basic public infrastructures have been demonstrated to have a positive impact on regional productivity in the
Spanish regions (e.g. Mas et al., 1997) , in contrast to social public infrastructures whose effect is not as clear.
13 This sector presents extreme values in several of the elasticities that have been computed.
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2 for the model: 0.995
Specification Tests:
       (1) F(3,2083)= 11.63
       (2) F(25, 2083)= 335.63
       (3) F(14, 2083)=  8.45
       (4) F(11, 2083)= 82.08
Total number of observations: 2160
The coefficients of the dummies are not reported
Table 3. Estimation for the ZKp function
Coefficients t-statistics
     bKp 0.175 0.126
     bKpKp -0.130 -50.191





2 for the model: 0.331
Specification tests:
       (1) F(1,2104)= 10.30
       (2) F(25, 2104)= 23.62
       (3) F(14, 2104)=  23.11
       (4) F(11, 2104)= 38.07
Total number of observations: 2160
The coefficients of the dummies are not reported3
Table 4. Public Capital Effects
SHORT RUN LONG RUN
ecKg SKg eLKg eMKg ecKg SKg eLKg eMKg
GLOBAL AVERAGE
-0.059 0.023 -0.035 0.009 -0.053 0.021 -0.018 0.005
REGIONAL AVERAGE
AND -0.051 0.016 -0.040 0.009 -0.031 0.010 -0.097 0.009
ARA -0.062 0.014 -0.035 0.009 -0.043 0.010 -0.137 0.037
AST -0.056 0.029 -0.031 0.009 -0.024 0.012 -0.136 0.059
CANT -0.065 0.028 -0.035 0.009 -0.064 0.028 0.046 -0.039
C-L -0.062 0.020 -0.040 0.009 -0.044 0.014 -0.112 0.019
C-M -0.060 0.014 -0.043 0.009 -0.020 0.004 -0.191 0.022
CAT -0.057 0.027 -0.035 0.009 -0.078 0.038 0.150 -0.021
VAL -0.058 0.017 -0.034 0.009 -0.031 0.009 -0.115 0.021
EXT -0.058 0.010 -0.036 0.009 -0.049 0.008 -0.075 0.020
GAL -0.062 0.018 -0.043 0.009 -0.065 0.019 -0.024 0.002
MAD -0.065 0.027 -0.028 0.010 -0.061 0.026 -0.062 0.009
MUR -0.068 0.024 -0.040 0.009 -0.062 0.022 -0.052 0.017
NAV -0.070 0.022 -0.040 0.009 -0.051 0.016 -0.146 0.021
PV -0.053 0.021 -0.027 0.010 -0.044 0.018 -0.007 0.005
RIO -0.073 0.021 -0.047 0.009 -0.060 0.017 -0.089 0.026
SECTORAL AVERAGE
S1 -0.065 0.029 -0.055 0.011 -0.055 0.024 -0.084 0.016
S2 -0.056 0.009 -0.027 0.011 -0.025 0.004 -0.040 0.020
S3 -0.060 0.019 -0.048 0.010 -0.065 0.021 0.083 -0.008
S4 -0.075 0.019 -0.029 0.013 -0.082 0.021 0.101 -0.053
S5 -0.038 0.006 -0.012 0.006 -0.031 0.005 -0.043 0.022
S6 -0.045 0.010 -0.015 0.007 -0.062 0.014 0.036 -0.020
S7 -0.110 0.046 -0.047 0.016 -0.092 0.038 -0.096 0.035
S8 -0.291 0.150 -0.246 0.035 -0.184 0.095 -0.743 0.099
S9 -0.064 0.020 -0.026 0.010 -0.045 0.014 -0.073 0.027
S10 -0.040 0.008 -0.018 0.007 -0.034 0.007 -0.049 0.019
S11 -0.030 0.004 -0.014 0.005 -0.024 0.003 -0.050 0.017
S12 -0.044 0.006 -0.018 0.007 -0.026 0.003 -0.090 0.036
TEMPORAL AVERAGE
1980 -0.056 0.024 -0.028 0.010 -0.049 0.021 -0.047 0.014
1981 -0.055 0.023 -0.029 0.010 -0.029 0.012 -0.144 0.045
1982 -0.055 0.021 -0.031 0.010 -0.039 0.015 -0.083 0.024
1983 -0.055 0.022 -0.033 0.009 -0.041 0.016 -0.119 0.035
1984 -0.055 0.021 -0.035 0.009 -0.031 0.012 -0.092 0.005
1985 -0.056 0.021 -0.037 0.009 -0.042 0.016 -0.077 0.003
1986 -0.057 0.021 -0.037 0.009 -0.035 0.013 -0.096 0.031
1987 -0.060 0.023 -0.037 0.009 -0.040 0.016 -0.119 0.018
1988 -0.062 0.025 -0.038 0.009 -0.054 0.022 -0.108 0.007
1989 -0.064 0.026 -0.039 0.009 -0.042 0.017 -0.152 0.033
1990 -0.064 0.026 -0.038 0.009 -0.052 0.021 -0.041 -0.000
1991 -0.065 0.025 -0.038 0.009 -0.186 0.071 0.857 -0.1574
Table 5. Private Capital Effects
SHORT RUN LONG RUN
ecKp SKp eLKp eMKp ecKp SKp
GLOBAL AVERAGE
-0.064 0.130 0.286 -0.075 0.105 -0.211
REGIONAL AVERAGE
AND -0.051 0.104 0.326 -0.072 0.291 -0.595
ARA -0.061 0.135 0.289 -0.074 -0.292 0.652
AST -0.013 0.011 0.250 -0.077 -0.661 0.565
CANT -0.020 0.023 0.283 -0.075 0.127 -0.148
C-L -0.069 0.198 0.322 -0.072 0.095 -0.272
C-M -0.074 0.154 0.353 -0.072 -0.590 1.236
CAT -0.075 0.167 0.287 -0.075 0.424 -0.941
VAL -0.076 0.165 0.280 -0.074 -0.498 1.080
EXT -0.048 0.088 0.296 -0.075 0.267 -0.492
GAL -0.086 0.232 0.348 -0.072 0.562 -1.509
MAD -0.071 0.156 0.230 -0.078 -0.061 0.134
MUR -0.096 0.215 0.329 -0.072 0.591 -1.321
NAV -0.077 0.184 0.326 -0.074 0.125 -0.301
PV -0.025 0.028 0.217 -0.080 0.158 -0.178
RIO -0.085 0.224 0.384 -0.071 0.135 -0.355
SECTORAL AVERAGE
S1 -0.001 0.001 0.447 -0.092 0.342 -0.271
S2 0.005 -0.006 0.217 -0.088 -0.874 1.029
S3 -0.007 0.010 0.393 -0.079 0.040 -0.060
S4 -0.064 0.105 0.233 -0.102 0.277 -0.454
S5 -0.033 0.085 0.097 -0.047 0.032 -0.081
S6 -0.044 0.096 0.125 -0.055 0.113 -0.246
S7 -0.117 0.326 0.383 -0.128 0.305 -0.845
S8 -0.489 1.268 2.004 -0.286 0.419 -1.088
S9 -0.087 0.193 0.214 -0.081 0.049 -0.108
S10 -0.023 0.037 0.146 -0.055 0.103 -0.166
S11 -0.018 0.025 0.113 -0.040 -0.143 0.205
S12 -0.048 0.097 0.149 -0.060 0.011 -0.021
TEMPORAL AVERAGE
1980 -0.079 0.140 0.229 -0.079 0.236 -0.417
1981 -0.074 0.128 0.237 -0.078 0.107 -0.184
1982 -0.073 0.123 0.250 -0.077 0.078 -0.132
1983 -0.059 0.107 0.269 -0.076 -0.005 0.009
1984 -0.059 0.108 0.288 -0.075 0.199 -0.362
1985 -0.065 0.121 0.304 -0.074 -0.061 0.113
1986 -0.077 0.145 0.301 -0.074 -0.154 0.290
1987 -0.051 0.108 0.300 -0.074 -0.237 0.501
1988 -0.061 0.140 0.310 -0.073 -0.040 0.091
1989 -0.063 0.150 0.316 -0.073 -0.016 0.038
1990 -0.054 0.130 0.313 -0.073 0.128 -0.310
1991 -0.057 0.135 0.313 -0.073 1.022 -2.4315
Table 6. Locational Effects   Table 7. Output Effects
GLOBAL AVERAGE GLOBAL AVERAGE
eKpKg(LR
)
eKpKg(SR) eKpL eKpM eLKg eMKg eYKg(SR) eYKp eCY eYKg(LR) eYKp (LR) eCY(LR)
0.060 0.076 -0.876 -2.167 -0.035 0.009 0.079 0.086 0.739 0.112 -0.767 0.407
REGIONAL AVERAGE REGIONAL AVERAGE
AND -0.048 0.049 1.420 -10.343 -0.040 0.009 0.071 0.070 0.724 0.501 -7.136 0.135
ARA -0.372 -0.149 6.834 -1.564 -0.035 0.009 0.082 0.079 0.756 0.079 0.109 0.308
AST -0.597 0.025 25.402 -3.480 -0.031 0.009 0.075 0.013 0.746 0.062 -0.038 0.593
CANT 0.538 0.586 1.763 -0.467 -0.035 0.009 0.083 0.022 0.781 0.003 0.221 0.568
C-L -0.156 -0.150 -0.548 -0.634 -0.040 0.009 0.084 0.094 0.738 0.024 0.205 0.360
C-M -0.229 -0.053 3.726 2.474 -0.043 0.009 0.078 0.094 0.773 0.150 -0.604 0.262
CAT 0.453 0.303 -7.514 -3.436 -0.035 0.009 0.078 0.104 0.721 0.052 -0.184 0.418
VAL -0.172 -0.045 1.973 2.574 -0.034 0.009 0.077 0.101 0.747 0.108 -0.261 0.669
EXT -0.138 -0.153 -0.934 -3.044 -0.036 0.009 0.073 0.059 0.799 0.356 0.675 -0.085
GAL 0.077 -0.038 -3.680 -0.446 -0.043 0.009 0.081 0.112 0.768 0.257 -2.212 0.330
MAD -0.028 0.082 2.500 -2.792 -0.028 0.010 0.088 0.096 0.735 0.111 -0.184 0.749
MUR -0.101 -0.204 -1.822 -0.479 -0.040 0.009 0.084 0.118 0.809 -0.008 0.563 -0.423
NAV -0.199 -0.062 0.232 -11.906 -0.040 0.009 0.091 0.098 0.776 0.012 0.475 0.347
PV 0.066 -0.023 -3.532 2.970 -0.027 0.010 0.073 0.034 0.719 -0.062 1.032 0.263
RIO -0.219 -0.169 1.496 0.654 -0.047 0.009 0.090 0.105 0.806 0.091 0.955 0.514
SECTORAL AVERAGE SECTORAL AVERAGE
S1 -0.067 -0.031 1.737 1.992 -0.055 0.011 0.088 -0.003 0.960 0.080 -1.698 0.789
S2 -0.102 0.535 28.048 3.862 -0.027 0.011 0.075 -0.006 0.815 0.097 0.112 0.577
S3 0.276 0.589 3.285 -21.427 -0.048 0.010 0.081 0.010 0.846 0.037 -0.086 0.452
S4 0.762 0.639 -6.777 -2.486 -0.029 0.013 0.098 0.083 0.945 0.030 1.130 0.989
S5 -0.184 -0.186 -0.398 -0.557 -0.012 0.006 0.050 0.044 0.422 0.046 -0.123 0.411
S6 0.307 0.320 -1.736 -5.441 -0.015 0.007 0.059 0.058 0.504 0.039 0.219 1.021
S7 -0.237 -0.400 -4.886 2.283 -0.047 0.016 0.148 0.158 1.236 0.208 -0.234 0.108
S8 -0.994 -0.785 2.214 -2.297 -0.246 0.035 0.376 0.630 3.376 0.891 -4.852 -0.821
S9 -0.221 -0.203 0.179 -1.333 -0.026 0.010 0.081 0.111 0.804 0.151 0.832 0.119
S10 -0.150 -0.157 -0.158 -0.656 -0.018 0.007 0.054 0.031 0.519 0.049 -0.109 0.471
S11 -0.159 -0.009 4.880 -1.785 -0.014 0.005 0.040 0.023 0.384 0.053 -1.364 0.327
S12 -0.356 -0.312 0.930 -2.077 -0.018 0.007 0.056 0.061 0.587 0.056 -0.208 0.565
TEMPORAL AVERAGE TEMPORAL AVERAGE
1980 -0.056 -0.159 -5.615 -2.208 -0.028 0.010 0.077 0.108 0.727 0.240 -0.502 0.457
1981 -0.456 -0.444 -1.007 -3.202 -0.029 0.010 0.076 0.101 0.731 -0.196 1.139 0.376
1982 -0.192 -0.162 1.151 -0.538 -0.031 0.010 0.074 0.098 0.736 0.070 0.090 0.593
1983 -0.342 -0.245 3.277 -0.630 -0.033 0.009 0.075 0.079 0.742 0.109 -0.365 0.451
1984 -0.004 0.181 0.640 -19.610 -0.035 0.009 0.074 0.079 0.748 0.154 -1.306 0.442
1985 0.035 0.016 -3.260 1.957 -0.037 0.009 0.074 0.086 0.750 -0.065 1.250 0.600
1986 -0.268 -0.081 8.562 2.904 -0.037 0.009 0.077 0.102 0.747 0.019 0.219 0.553
1987 -0.149 -0.030 2.238 -0.059 -0.037 0.009 0.080 0.068 0.744 0.971 -11.850 0.562
1988 -0.030 0.042 0.323 -2.758 -0.038 0.009 0.084 0.081 0.742 -0.112 1.595 0.586
1989 -0.333 -0.240 2.238 -1.227 -0.039 0.009 0.086 0.084 0.740 0.033 0.345 0.478
1990 0.106 0.197 1.401 -4.932 -0.038 0.009 0.087 0.072 0.733 0.053 0.213 0.377
1991 2.412 1.834 -20.456 4.301 -0.038 0.009 0.089 0.076 0.727 0.064 -0.031 -0.596